Volume 17
Issue 1 Winter 1977
Winter 1977

An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights
David Berry
Gene Steiker

Recommended Citation
David Berry & Gene Steiker, An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights, 17 Nat. Resources
J. 55 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol17/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
DAVID BERRY* and GENE STEIKER*

INTRODUCTION
The increasing and often urgent concern with protecting valuable
landscapes or landmarks from expanding urban development has induced a strong awareness among many people of the public, noneconomic value of what has traditionally been viewed as private
property. These landscapes and landmarks are not easily amendable
to recognition in the land market since their value is largely noneconomic, i.e., not based on gains from exchange. Among the kinds
of valuable resources threatened by expanding urbanization are:'
1. historically or archaeologically significant sites or buildings
2. architecturally important buildings
3. landscapes having
a. locally representative or locally unique plant and animal communities
b. aesthetic and contemplative values
c. hazardous natural processes (such as recurrent floods)

d. beneficial natural processes (such as aquifers which supply
drinking water)

e. recreational potential, or

f. agricultural value
Behind the conversion of valuable landmarks and landscapes lies
the temptation of money to be made on the exchange of land. In
fact, land speculation is an old American tradition. From the earliest
European settlements on the east coast of North America through
the post-revolutionary war expansion into the south and midwest up
to the present day land dealings on the rural-urban fringe, speculation has been an important element in the exchange of land.2
*Each author is a Research Associate, Regional Science Research Institute, Post Office
Box 8776, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
1. See J. Costonis, Development Rights ransfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 Yale L.J.
(1973) for a discussion of threatened buildings; and Berry, Preservationof Open Space and
the Concept of Value, 35 Am. J. of Econ. & Soc. 113 (1976) fora discussion of landscape
values.
2. Trewartha, Types of Rural Settlement in Colonial America, 36 Geog. Rev. 568-96
(1946); M. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business (1968); C. M. Green, American Cities in
the Growth of the Nation (1965); and The Public Lands (V. Carstensen, ed. 1962).
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On the rural-urban fringe, a pattern of rising land prices is common. Figure 1 summarizes the pattern of land pric&s on agricultural
and undeveloped parcels larger than ten acres along part of the ruralurban fringe of suburban Philadelphia. Several cases are represented,
all occurring within ten miles of each other in the period from January 1970 through January 1973. The pattern took the form of
three stages, including: 1) an incipient stage of speculation and development which can gradually evolve into 2) a transitional stage characterized by either a number of recent sales near the parcel in
question, or a major road near the parcel in question, or some development near the parcel in question, and which may eventually evolve
into 3) a state of active development where a number of recent sales
have occurred near the parcel in question, a major road lies near the
parcel in question, and development abounds near the parcel in question.
For land on the rural-urban fringe the gap between the exchange
value for potential conversion and the exchange value for the purposes of maintaining current use such as agriculture or woodland 3 is
often dramatic. Similarly, the potential gain from demolishing a
valuable landmark and putting up a new building or opening up a
parking lot are often enormous. Thus, the economic penalty for not
participating in speculation and conversion falls heavily on the
preservationist so that maintaining current uses during this rush to
speculate and convert is often difficult.
Associated with speculation in land are a number of other social
problems. For example, farmers on the rural-urban fringe may cease
investments in their farms in anticipation of the big development
which may or may not ever materialize. As a result, unconverted
farmland may be prohibitively expensive to return to agricultural
production.4 Further social problems may be caused by an uncontrolled pattern of expansion of urban land uses, which can cause
unnecessary increases in aggregate transportation costs and provision
of public services. Leapfrogging and strip development are often
accused of such economic inefficiencies. 5 As a final example, the use
of the police power to restrict noxious agricultural activities and the
taxation of rural land to serve urban interests, such as water or sewer
3. It should be kept in mind that not all land on most rural-urban fringes will or can bc
converted to urban uses. There is simply too much land and not enough people to ac.
complish this.
4. H. Conklin and R. Dymsza, Maintaining Viable Agriculture in Areas of Urban Expan.
sion, N.Y. St. Off. of Planning Serv. (1972).
5. Coun. on Envt'l. Qual., 5th Ann. Rep. (1974); and Real Estate Res. Corp., The Cost!
of Sprawl (1974).
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districts, all may serve to hasten the disappearance of agricultural

activity.
In response to the problems of more urbanization, either within an
existing core city or on the fringes of the metropolis, a number of
methods have been proposed, and some implemented, to protect

valuable landscapes and landmarks and to generally control the
spatial pattern of growth. Six are especially prominent:
6
1. tax incentives, such as preferential assessment
2. zoning, including agricultural and open space zoning 7
3. public purchase of certain development rights on valuable landscapes and landmarks8
4. public purchase of the fee on valuable landscapes and landmarks 9
5. rural districts, such as New York's agricultural districts' 0
6. transfer of development rights' 1

When compared along three major criteria, cost to the public,
effectiveness in preserving the valuable landscape or landmark, and
the issue of taking private property without compensation, transferable development rights (TDRs) fare very well on paper. It is argued
that TDRs impose little cost on the public since it is essentially a
market operation. Further, they are arguably very effective and relatively difficult to thwart when properly planned, and they provide
compensation to landowners whose development rights are restricted
so as to protect designated landscapes or landmarks. Each of the
other methods fares worse on at least one of the three criteria.
Although transfer of development rights has yet to be carried out
on a large scale, a number of rural-urban fringe municipalities are
6. R. Gloudemans, Use-Value Farmland Assessments, Theory, Practice, and Impact,
International Assoc. of Assessing Officers (1974); J. Keene et al, Untaxing Open Spaces,
C.E.Q. (1975).
7. F. Bosselman, D. Callies, and J. Banta, The Taking Issue (1973); Kingham, State and
Local Wetlands Regulations: The Problem of Taking Without Just Compensation, 58 Va. L.
Rev. 876 (1972); The Use of the Land (W. Reilly, ed. 1973).
8. W. Bryant, Farmland and Preservation Alternatives in Semi-Suburban Areas, N.Y. St.
Col. of Agric., Cornell, A.E. Ext 75-5 (1975).
9. Strong, Incentives and Controls for Open Space, in Metropolitan Open Space and
Natural Process (D. Wallace, ed. 1970); Reilly, supra note 7.
10. Conklin & Bryant, Agricultural Districts: a Compromise Approach to Agricultural
Preservation, 56 Am. J. of Agric'l. Econ. (1974).
11. Bennett, Transfer of Development Rights, Penn. Envt'l. Coun. (1976); W. Bryant,
supra note 8; J. Costonis, supra note 1; Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development
Rights: a New Concept in Land Use Management, Extension Leaflet 492, Rug. U.; Rose,
The Transfer of Development Rights: a Preview of an Evolving Concept, 3 Real Estate L. J.
330 (1975); Shlaes, Who Pays for Development Rights?, 40 Planning 7 (1974); Shlaes, The
Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 Appraisal J. 526 (1974); & Woodbury,
Transfer of Development Rights: a New Tool for Planners, 41 J. Am. Inst. of Planners 3
(1975). For a recent bibliography see Helb, Chavooshian & Nieswand, Leaflet 533, Coop.

Extension Serv., Rut. U.
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considering it.' 2 It therefore seems prudent to go beyond previous
legal and planning investigations to undertake a study of the economics of TDRs. Since actual experience with TDRs is minimal, our
analysis must of necessity be in terms of principles and expected
occurrences.
In outline, our argument begins with the concept of development
rights assuming equilibrium in the markets for land, development
rights, and housing and commercial building, the last being summarized in the commodity, floor space. We then dissect this equilibrium situation by first looking at just the market for development
rights. Next, the nature of the equilibria in the markets for development rights, land and floor space are simultaneously examined in
terms of the demand for floor space and the production function for
floor space in a competitive market. Finally, we list our conclusions.
Further technical analyses are presented in the appendices.
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AND THE
PRIVILEGE OF PROPERTY
Land in the United States is considered property. As such, it is
regarded as a bundle of privileges: the privilege of use, the privilege
of exchange, and the privilege of conversion.' I Economists have
been primarily interested in land because it is a factor which is exchanged impersonally in a market and commands a rent." We shall
classify exchanges by whether they are intended to preserve the current use of the land or whether they are intended to eventually result
in conversion. It is not necessary that the intention to convert
actually materialize, since speculators may guess wrong and "lose
their shirts." From our introductory comments it is not surprising
that rents resulting from exchanges of landscape, or landmarks in
urban areas or on the rural-urban fringe are often dominated by a
conversion-exchange value.
When public action in the form of the police power is proposed to
protect certain landscapes or landmarks from conversion, the landowner's privilege of conversion, but not use or exchange, is severely
restricted. Hence, a large potential rent is lost. Whether and in what
circumstances the police power imposes a taking without com12. See Woodbury and Rose, supra note 11.
13. This is essentially Driver's classification of the privileges of property except that the
privilege of destruction has been replaced by the privilege of conversion: H. Driver, Indians
of North America (1969). See also M. Herskovits, Economic Anthropology (1940).
14. In general, all exchanges are not for money or impersonal. A farmer may give or sell
his land for a nominal price to his son or land may be given as part of a reciprocal agreement
in an exchange between friends or in a business relationship, whether legal or illegal. For a
discussion of the concept of economic rent see J. Eaton, PoliticalEconomy (1966).
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pensation, however, is a question open to debate. Some writers' S
feel that compensation is usually required and there are numerous
recent court decisions to support this view.' 6 On the other hand,
Bosselman, Callies, and Banta' I argue that over the long run,
spatially coordinated regulation of land use to protect demonstrable
public values, such as valuable landscapes and landmarks, does not
constitute a taking requiring compensation. There are court decisions
to support this view as well.' ' Essentially, this latter view regards
restrictions on the privilege of conversion as acceptable, but views
restrictions on the privileges of current use and exchange as requiring
compensation.
Transfer of development rights is a scheme whose aim is to effectively control land use in response to public values at minimal public
cost and to neatly sidestep the taking issue. How this scordatura
zoning is supposed to work is outlined in the paragraphs below. Since
the discussion of TDRs in the literature is daily growing, we shall not
belabor the points but refer the reader to these other papers for
details.' 9
The first step in establishing TDRs is the identification of zones
for development and zones for preservation, growth and no-growth
zones. Each growth zone must have associated with it an upper limit
on development density while the no-growth zones are limited to
little or no further development. The upper limit in a growth zone
may be nothing more than the previous zoning constraint or it may
be a new constraint based upon estimates of development in the
absence of a TDR scheme or upon environmental considerations or
other criteria. In general, the new upper limit on development is
relatively low so that higher densities, which may be necessary to
accommodate households excluded from no-growth zones, are
potentially profitable. To build at higher densities, developers will
have to purchase transferable development rights that allow them to
legally exceed the upper limit on development in proportion to the
number of transferable development rights obtained. There may be,
however, an upper limit on the number of TDRs one can use on any
site.
,-'The second step involves the creation of development rights and
their allocation to land owners in the no-growth zone. These rights
15. W. R. Bryant, supra note 8.
16. E.g. Morris County Land Improvement Co. vs. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). See also W. Reilly, supra note 7.
17. The Taking Issue, supra note 7.
18. E.g. Just v. Marinette County 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
19. See note 11,supra.
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may be in the form of certificates allowing the construction of so
many square feet of dwelling units or commercial buildings. There
may even be different kinds of certificates for different kinds of
construction. Certificates may be allocated to land owners in the
no-growth zone in a number of ways. For example, they may be
assigned in proportion to acreage owned, appraised development
value, assessed value before the TDR scheme, or estimated development in the growth and no-growth zones before the TDR scheme. 2
Thus, land owners in the no-growth zones will be given an exchangeable commodity, transferable development rights, for the loss of the
privilege of conversion and compensation for the loss of this privilege
is purported to be made. 2
To summarize the intended role of TDRs, we refer to Figure 2.
The vertical axis is dollars per acre and the horizontal axis is distance
from the central business district. Assume that distance is the only
feature which differentiates the quality of land so that the diagram
may be simply presented. At equilibrium, curve X1 represents the
land rent which could be squeezed from the economic surplus of the
builders of floor space before the TDR program is put into effect.
Economic surplus is the excess of revenues from the sale of floor
space over the material, managerial, and labor costs of supplying the
floor space. Of course, this surplus ultimately derives from the consumers of floor space. Rents on land and development rights are
treated as residual distributions out of surplus. Now let the TDR
program go into effect. Some land can no longer be developed and
higher densities can be achieved on land in the growth zone only if
development rights are purchased presumably increasing the economic surplus of producing floor space in at least some of the growth
zone. At equilibrium, the new rent at any distance is represented by
20. The problem with actually assigning development rights in proportion to expected
growth before the TDR plan is established is estimating expected growth for each location.
General growth patterns can, of course, be forecast, but there are considerations of the
effect of land prices, construction costs, income, demographic factors, and so on all of
which will influence the demand for growth. In addition, attempts to make fine distinctions
among adjacent parcels of land in order to determine where growth is more likely may be a
fruitless endeavor and assignment of development rights would thus seem most equitable
and efficient using a simple formula.
21. More general uses for TDRs have been considered. For example, all land could be
stripped of development rights and then zoned for various kinds of development. Transferable development rights could then be awarded to all land owners but developers would
have to purchase the requisite number of rights before building anything. This scheme
attempts to smooth out inequities resulting from all zoning decisions and not just from
preservation zoning. The conclusions from our more restricted analysis are easily generalized
to cover this broader situation but because preservation uses seem more likely to be enacted
in the next few years than more general TDR schemes, we have limited our analysis to the
preservation approach.
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FIGURE 2
EQUILIBRIUM RENTS BEFORE TDR PROGRAM (X,) AND
AFTER TDR PROGRAM (X2 )

curve X 2 . This is the sum of land rent per acre plus the rent on
development rights divided by acres per development right .2 21 The
magnitude of these two rents is the subject of the following sections.
THE MARKET FOR DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
In order for the sale of development rights to offset, to any extent, the loss of the exchange-for-conversion value of land zoned for
preservation as open space or other uses, the dollar value of development rights must approach the conversion value of the land minus
its exchange value if conversion were prohibited. Having reviewed the
basic mechanism of TDRs assuming equilibrium in the markets for
land, development rights, and floor space, we now address the issue
of the rent and market for such rights. In this section, we shall
assume that the rent on land is given. This assumption will be relaxed
in the next section.
Insofar as a developable parcel of land has a certain degree of
22. Note that curves X, and X, refer only to urban uses of land, not agricultural or
other "underdeveloped" uses.
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accessibility, amenities, soil characteristics, zoning restrictions, and
social and political characteristics spilling over from neighboring land
that are more desirable than other parcels of land, that parcel commands a differential rent when exchanged. In addition, a parcel of
land may command an absolute rent when exchanged which reflects
the scarcity of all developable land in the region. This scarcity may
be induced by zoning restrictions or political boundaries as well as by
a natural limitation on the quantity of land.
Development rights, being a homogeneous good, can command an
absolute rent when exchanged. Their exchange value depends upon
their relative scarcity which in turn is determined by the number of
development rights created and the bid rent function for development rights. In particular, the supply of these rights is created by law
and is shown as one of the vertical curves designated Si in Figure 3.
Since availability of these rights does not depend upon some production process, concepts of marginal cost are irrelevant and so the
supply curves are price inelastic. Given a rent on land, the bid rent
for development rights is analogous to a demand curve, and it is
C
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0.
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Crr
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FIGURE 3
1HE MARKET FOR DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS GIVEN THE RENT ON LAND:
BID RENT, B; SUPPLY, S; AND ABSOLUTE RENT
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shown as curve. It is the aggregate marginal surplus of developmental
rights in the floor space industry in the region and is downward
sloping to reflect the assumed decreasing marginal surplus per development right as the number of these rights used in the production of
floor space increases.
From the diagram it is quite apparent that the absolute rent of the
development rights depends on the number of rights created. If that
number is relatively large, such as that represented by curves S1 and
S2 , the bid rent for all the rights on the market would be at or near
zero. If they are relatively scarce, as represented by curve S3, their
rent will be bid up to r. Thus, in order to make the market for
development rights yield an absolute rent large enough to suffice as
compensation for the loss of the privilege of conversion, the number
of rights created must be carefully contrived with a knowledge of the
shape of the bid rent curve. 2 3
Another issue related to the price of developemnt rights is the
possibility of speculation in these rights. If the bid rent curve is
expected to shift outward over time because the demand for new
construction becomes more certain or increases, then development
rights holders can engage in speculation. They might refuse to sell
their certificates in the early stages of development in the growth
zone in anticipation of obtaining larger rents later on. Consequently,
the constricted supply in these early years would increase the rent
during this time period. As before, the increase in price is a function
of the number of rights actually put on the market during the early
stages.
Parenthetically, we note that the owners of land in the growth
zone will be at least as likely and probably more likely to exchange
their land for conversion purposes if some other land is designated
for no growth and thereby removed as competition. Hence the expected rent, rent multiplied by the probability of actually making a
sale, of a land owner in the growth zone is likely to increase under a
TDR program.
How is Figure 3 related to Figure 2? At any distance from the
23. One way to help insure the scarcity of development rights is through an intermediary
monopoly holder of development rights, such as a government agency or designated agent
which can deliberately withhold rights from the market in order to guarantee a high rent.
The withholding action may be by 1) public purchase of development rights at some "parity
price," 2) refusing to give out (or create) all the development rights in the first place, or 3)
only the agency selling development rights and limiting sales so as to gain a high rent; the
monopolist would then distribute the rents to the landowners in the no-growth zone in
proportion to their losses of exchange value. All three remedies require administrative costs
and the first requires a large initial expenditure (or bond issue) before substantial revenue
from sales can be obtained.
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central business district in Figure 2 each producer of floor space buys
development rights until his marginal surplus of doing so equals the
market rent represented by r in Figure 3. Hence, the rent per acre
curve after development rights have been purchased, X2 , will sit
above curve X1 (assuming X, is the given rent on land) such that the
vertical difference between the curves multiplied by acres per development right is the rent r in Figure 3. If acres per development right
are the same everywhere then curve X2 will be parallel to X, (outside the no-growth zone). Finally, if no developer can afford the rent
on TDRs in a particular location, development rights will not be used
there.
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MARKETS FOR LAND AND
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
So far, we have established the basic workings of the market for
development rights and the conditions necessary to obtain a positive
rent for those rights. However, we must still address the issue of
whether the exchange value of the transferable development rights is
adequate to compensate TDR holders for the inability to convert
their land. To evaluate the issue of adequate compensation it is
necessary to simultaneously investigate the relationships between the
bid rents for land and development rights, the availability of each,
and the demand for floor space which is produced by combining
land, development rights, and managerial, material, and labor inputs.' ' To facilitate the discussion a numerical example is used.
The central concept in our analysis is the "surplus function." This
function associates combinations of land, development rights, and
other inputs with surplus, surplus being the dollar value of revenues
from the sale of floor space minus the material, managerial, and labor
costs of producing the floor space. Rents on land and development
rights are not considered as predetermined costs here but are to be
derived according to bid rents based upon the surplus maximizing
behavior of developers. That is, the rents are bid out of surplus.
The object of this analysis is to evaluate the distribution of rent
24. Floorspace measured in units such as square feet will be taken as a homogeneous
product in the analysis. Product differentiation due to factors such as location, neighborhood effects, housing styles and layout although extremely important in housing markets is
disregarded to avoid unnecessary complication. This may be incorporated in the analysis by
distinguishing between qualitatively different types of floorspace as subject to separate
markets. Producers of all types of floorspace require inputs of land and development rights,
however, so that the derived local demand schedules for these resources might be similarly
determined and summed to develop the aggregate bid rent curves. These curves in combination with the resource supplies determine the rents of land and development rights in
the local market. Production of each type of floorspace given these factor prices and
availability could then be determined.
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between landowners and holders of development rights once a transfer of development rights program is implemented. 2 I
Implicit in the surplus function are, of course, the sales price of
floor space and the costs of materials and other inputs. We shall
assume that the costs of materials and labor are given and that the
developers act as price takers when these inputs are considered. With
regard to the price of floor space we make the following observation.
Transfer of development rights arrangements will probably be tried
as pilot programs before an entire metropolitan area becomes committed to the scheme. Thus, we can expect TDRs to be instituted, at
least initially, for only one or a few townships within a larger metropolitan area. In this case, housing prices will be determined by the
overall metropolitan area housing market so that developers in the
pilot township will be unable to influence the price of floor space as
competitive producers. The analysis assumes such a situation.
Including the additional assumption of constant returns to scale in
the production of floor space, the surplus function will exhibit constant returns to scale. This implies that by doubling all inputs, twice
as much floorspace could be produced generating exactly double the
amount of surplus. These conditions were chosen because they are
the most general assumptions for the numerical example. 2 6
These assumptions also suggest that the developers in the pilot
township are constrained only by resource limitations on land and
transferable development rights, since any quantity of floor space
may be produced and sold profitably without influencing housing
prices determined in the larger metropolitan market. It should be
kept in mind, however, that the assumption of constant returns to
scale does not mean that the group of developers in these few townships are price takers with respect to land rents; rather the surplus
they can generate, will determine their bid rent curves for land and
development. 2 7
If material, labor, and managerial inputs are treated as one composite input, then surplus maximizing developers can be assumed to
act so that the marginal surplus of this composite input equals zero.
25. See Appendix for a more detailed discussion of the analytical methods used.
26. It is by no means necessary to use a surplus function with constant returns to scale.
Increasing returns or decreasing returns to scale may also be possible in the production
function for floorspace and if the demand for floorspace is downward sloping, the surplus
function must exhibit decreasing returns to scale over at least part of its range. This latter
case is precluded in examining only a small sub-area of a metropolitan region where producers act as competitive producers in a large market. Constant returns to scale in production was considered the most general and realistic assumption in the absence of further
empirical information. See the appendix for a discussion of a surplus function with decreasing returns to scale.
27. That is, one must avoid the fallacy of composition as Samuelson warns in his text.
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Consequently, the surplus function may be rewritten in terms of land
and development rights only. Figure 4 shows the surplus function for
the competitive developers in the pilot township as a function of
developable land, L, and transferable development rights, D. The
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FIGURE 4
ISO-SURPLUS CURVES AS A FUNCTION OF LAND
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more acres of land and the more development rights used, the greater
the surplus. In the example, each acre of land has associated with it
two non-transferable development rights according to local zoning
regulations. Transferable development rights are assigned to various
landowners and then may be purchased by developers wishing to
exceed the initial zoning limitations on density inherent in nontransferable development rights.
The bid rents on land and development rights may be determined
from Figure 4 by slicing the surplus function vertically, in the case of
TDRs, and horizontally, in the case of land. Along any slice, we can
calculate the increase in surplus of an increment in land or development rights holding the other factor constant. This marginal surplus is the bid rent for the factor, given the quantity of the other
factor. Families of bid rent curves for land and development rights,
respectively, appear in Figures 5 and 6.
In our pilot township the quantity of developable land is fixed by
its political boundaries, the TDR plan and the quantity of development rights is fixed by government action. If these quantities are
300 acres; implying 600 non-transferable development rights, and
400 transferable development rights then, according to Figure 4, the
total surplus is $40,520. The bid rent for 300 acres of land given 400
130 -
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FAMILY OF BID RENT CURVES FOR TRANSFERABLE
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS AS LAND, L, VARIES
transferable development rights is $101.6 per acre and the bid rent
for 400 transferable development rights given 300 acres of land is
$25.1 per development right. Because of constant returns to scale in
the surplus function total rent equals (300) ($101.6) + (400) ($25.1)
= $40,520, the total surplus.
We now turn to the question of the magnitude of rents on land
and development rights and the degree to which development rights
holders are compensated for the loss of the privilege of conversion of
their property. To do this we consider five cases of land use in the
pilot township. Let the township be divided into two regions, A,
(300 acres) and B, (200 acres) which will become growth and nogrowth zones, respectively, upon the implementation of a TDR
scheme.
Case 1. An initial case in which all local land is developable, and
before the TDR arrangements are put into effect, will be taken as the
base of reference. Supposing that there are 500 acres of developable
land, each acre associated with two non-transferable development
rights, the total land rent would be $49,050 or $98.1 per acre captured from the surplus of construction of 490.5 units of floor space
sold at $100 per unit. See Figures 4 and 5 where the supply of inputs
is 500 acres of land and no transferable development rights. The
results are referred to in Table 1 as Case 1.
Case 2. Next consider a case in which the 200 acres of land in
region B are zoned as non-developable without any compensation to
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the landowners. The results of Case 2 are also summarized in Table 1.
Less floorspace will be built, barring relaxation of zoning density
requirements on developable land, and therefore less total rent will
be generated. The owners of the land in the no-growth zone suffer
the entire loss of $98.1 per acre or $19.620.
Case 3. A third case illustrates the effects of implementing the
TDR scheme. Again the 200 acres of land in region B are set aside as
a no-growth zone but the total number of transferable and nontransferable development rights is kept constant. Four hundred
transferable development rights, two for each acre of land, are
awarded to land owners in the no-growth zone. Tracing through the
evolution of land and development rights markets to their equilibria
in the example, the market exchange value of the development rights
will be $10040. Although clearly better than no compensation, the
figure nevertheless represents considerably less than the initial development value of $19620 for 200 acres of land.
Two points should be noted about the results of the TDR arrangements. First, both the quantity of floor space produced, 405.2 units
selling at $100 per unit, and the total rents generated, $40,520, are
less than the base case where all land may be developed even though
the total number of development rights is not diminished. This is due
to the fact that both land and transferable development rights add to
surplus and are subject to diminishing marginal productivity. Removing quantities of either factor without increasing the other forces
producers to combine them in different and less productive proportions.
Secondly, rents on developable land increase from $98.1 to
$101.6 per acre as the result of implementing the TDR scheme. Since
the available supply of land has been reduced, its price quite naturally increases. This might be considered an undesirable effect of
TDR arrangements since landowners who have no claim to compensation are benefiting at the indirect expense of those who do.
However, this effect may also attract support for the TDR schemes
since many landowners will benefit from the innovation.
Because both total rents generated decline and the value of developable land increases when going from Case 1 to Case 3, holders of
development rights can never be fully compensated as the result of
the basic TDR arrangements. However, "just" compensation might
not necessarily imply full compensation, especially considering the
speculative unearned nature of rent. Unlike economic profits, rents
have little importance in motivating further socially desirable activity
since landowners are not able to produce more land as the rent
increases.
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Case 4. Basic TDR arrangements may be modified to alter compensations. One variant might be to regulate the market in order to
maintain larger rents on TDRs. This could be accomplished by the
government restricting the supply of transferable development rights
either by buying them back at a guaranteed price or by distributing
them to landowners incrementally over longer periods of time. The
results of such an approach, within the context of the example,
appear as Case 4 of Table 1 where it was assumed that no more than
half the TDRs would be distributed to landowners at any time. That
is, the government would not allow the second 200 developments
rights to enter the market until the first 200 were sold. Rent on
TDRs is thus raised slightly while rent on developable land is less
than that found in the simple TDR arrangement. In fact, in the
example, it is impossible to maintain a rent on TDRs equivalent to
full compensation since to do so would price development rights out
of the market.
Thus, government supervision of the TDR market appears to be
rather ineffectual. However, this is because the extreme elasticity of
bid rent curves for TDRs, found in the example, may not generally
be realistic. In any event, it seems that severe restrictions on supply
would be required to significantly alter the distribution of rents. This
might drastically increase the costs and administrative requirements
of such a program.
Case 5. A more effective approach to increase the value of development rights would be to relax average density constraints in the
pilot township and allow more development in the growth zone than
was previously permitted. Indeed, the preservation of large open
space tracts made feasible by TDR arrangements could create amenities sufficient to justify higher densities. Case 5 in Table 1 indicates
that increasing the supply of transferable development rights would
raise the total rents accruing TDR holders to approximately full
compensation levels, although the rent per development right falls
below that in Case 3.
CONCLUSIONS
Transfer of development rights arrangements have been proposed
as an innovation to avoid difficult problems of compensation which
hamper the effectiveness of land use controls, in a practical if not a
legal sense. An attempt has been made here to apply economic
analysis to examine the implications of such an approach. The conclusions, summarized below, are generally favorable to the efficacy
of the TDR idea used intelligently.
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A. TDRs are generally superior to other methods of protecting
valuable landscapes and landmarks because they impose relatively little cost on the public, they are essentially self-working
market operations that are difficult to thwart if properly planned, and because they provide some compensation to landowners
whose privileges of conversion are restricted.
B. Implementing a TDR program requires a sophisticated understanding of the interrelationships between the various submarkets for housing, commercial floorspace, land, etc. Without
such knowledge, use of TDRs may prove ineffectual or frustrating.
C. If applied on a limited scale; to protect isolated no-growth zones
within a large metropolitan area, the TDRs may be expected to
have an exchange value so long as the local land market is relatively active.
D. Within the boundaries of regions where development rights are
freely transferable, the rent paid per development right will be
everywhere the same.
E. There is no a priori guarantee that the total value of TDRs will
equal the total conversion value of protected land if expected
average local densities are held constant or even if they are increased somewhat.
F. Provisions for no-growth zones, combined with TDR arrangements, will tend to increase the value of developable land in the
local land markets.
G. Whether or not the sum of the rents for both land and development rights after a TDR scheme is implemented is more or less
than the total land rent prior to institution depends upon a
number of factors: the revenues generated and costs associated
with development, the amount of land put in the no-growth
zone, and the number of development rights created.
H. Implementation of a coordinated TDR scheme over an entire
metropolitan area would be a more difficult undertaking than for
a small part of the metropolis because more elaborate management would be required to insure scarcity in the aggregate supply
of development rights which, in turn, insures their exchange
value.
I. The division of the metropolitan area into smaller subregions
between which development rights are not transferable may
therefore be a more feasible regional approach to zoning with
TDR arrangements. In such a situation, possible reductions in
compensation due to overly optimistic estimates of future development would not be as widespread. If there is more than one
region within which development rights are transferable but
between which they are not, the rents on development rights in
the different regions may be different.
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Finally, we observe that a successful TDR scheme constitutes a
form of protective control over the landscape such that the distribution of rents accruing to landowners in the growth and no-growth
zones is in some narrow sense equitable. But the TDR approach does
not take into consideration the larger question of the equity of the
consumers of floor space paying rents ultimately to owners of land
and development rights. Rather, this method passively accepts the
transfer of wealth from consumers of floor space to land owners and
development rights holders and deals only with the redistributional
aspects of land use control within these narrow confines.

APPENDICES
A. Derivation of a Simple Surplus Function
A general production function identifies the relationship between
output (Q) and various combinations of inputs, designated land (L),
development rights (D), and all other inputs, including labor and
materials (M), as the relevant factors of production.
(1)

Q = f(L,D,M)

Given the production function, profits (7r) are defined as revenues
minus the cost of inputs,
T = p.f (L,D,M) - rLL - rDD - cM

(2)

where rL and rD are rents per unit on land and development rights, c
is the cost of other inputs and p is the market price for floorspace.
Note that in conventional economic terminology a minimum return
on capital, included above in M, is considered a cost, while profits are
returns to producers exceeding this rate of return.
Surplus (S) is revenues minus the costs of non-rent earning inputs,
S = p-f (L,D,M) - cM

(3)

or substituting (3) into (2)
(4)

S =

7r

+ rLL+ rDD

Since rents do not exist independently of the demand for floor-
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space, from the point of view of producers as a group, they are
determined simultaneously with profits and quantity of floorspace
produced. Thus, we assume that all producers of floor space behave
as surplus maximizers rather than merely profit maximizers. The
motivation to maximize surplus is, in part, induced by land and
development rights owners who wish to obtain the maximum bid
rent for their factors thus forcing the producers of floor space to gain
as much surplus as possible so as to successfully bid against each
other for land and TDRs.
Under competitive conditions, the bid rent for land is the marginal
surplus of land, which equals the marginal revenue product of land:
as = paf. Similarly for TDRs aS = pf
Assuming constant reD
5-3D
OL
-turns to scale and no indivisibilities, producer profits are zero, rents
absorb the entire amount of surplus, and the sum of all factor rents
plus input costs are equal to total revenues in competitive equilibrium. With decreasing returns to scale the value of the marginal
products for rent earning factors will be less than the total surplus
generated. Thus, producers will earn positive profits under competitive conditions.
If increasing returns to scale are assumed, the marginal revenue
products associated with rent producing inputs will exceed the total
surplus generated. Under competitive conditions therefore, producers
would operate at a loss and force either some readjustment of rents
away from competitive levels or require the combination of resource
extraction and ownership to support production. This latter case
may explain the prevalence of concentration and vertical integration
in many resource industries. Indeed, in the oil industry where strong
economies of scale exist, an oligopolistic market structure prevails
with the major companies dominating extraction and marketing as
well as production. In addition, the larger firms insist that their
refineries operate at a loss. Builders and developers also commonly
perform a dual role as land speculators.
B. Derivation of the Surplus Function Used in the Example
The example used in the text to evaluate compensation under
TDR arrangements assumed the following Cobb-Douglas type production function with constant returns to scale:
2
5
Q = L 3 (D + 2L) M
(5)
Note that the term in parenthesis (D + 2L) indicates that two nontransferable development rights are associated with each developable
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unit of land and transferable development rights (D) are used in
addition to these.
The resultant surplus function is therefore,
(6)

S = p [L 3 (D + 2L 5 M"2 1 - cM

According to this expression, higher density housing, expressed in
terms of a larger ratio of development rights to land and material
inputs, is assumed to be most productive of surplus. Increments of
structural quality, more labor and materials, generate surplus somewhat less rapidly.
Assuming surplus maximizing developers, we know that the marginal surplus of M in (6) will equal zero which allows us to solve for
M in terms of L and D,
(7)

aS/3M = .2p [L 3 (D + 2L) 5

(7a)

1 25
M = [.2pL3 (D+ 2L).5] .

M-8

] - c = 0, and

Substituting (7a) into (6) gives the expression used to generate the
isosurplus function represented in Figure 4.
(8)

S= pA [2PA]

3
where A = L- (D + 2L

25

_ c [2

1.2 5

5

p = 100
c= 50
The actual form of a relevant surplus function is, of course, an
empirical question and results would vary using different relationships. However, the example was chosen to exhibit general characteristics including decreasing marginal productivity for all factors and
constant returns to scale so that the major conclusions derived from
the analysis should be valid.
C A More GeneralSurplus Function
The surplus function used in the main body of this paper exhibited constant returns to scale due to two assumed conditions.
First, the production function for floorspace was assumed to have
constant returns to scale. Second, the local developers were regarded
as being competitive producers of floorspace in the larger metropolitan area both individually and as a group. Therefore, the total
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quantity of floorspace produced locally would not significantly alter
the overall market and any amount of floorspace might be produced
locally and sold at a constant price determined in the larger market.
Examining the results of implementing TDR arrangements for a
large sector of a metropolitan area, as opposed to a single small
municipality, requires the second condition to be relaxed so that the
floorspace producing industry would realistically be facing a downward sloping demand curve. This refinement poses no serious difficulties in the methodology used above. Given a more general
demand relationship in terms of the price of floorspace, p, and the
quantity of floorspace, Q,
(9)

p = g(Q),

and a production function as before (1), the surplus function would
be modified as follows,
(3a)

S

=

g(Q) - f(L,D,M) - cM

where Q
f(L,D,M).
An interesting result in this more general case is that given a production function with constant returns to scale, the surplus function
will exhibit decreasing and even negative returns to scale over part of
its range because increases in output will now reduce floorspace
prices. Using the same production function as in the original example
(5) and the simple demand curve shown below,
(9a)

P

=

a - bQ

the resulting surplus function would be quadratic in Q,
(10)

S = (a- bQ) [L 3 (D + 2L)

5

M. 2 ] - cM

or, substituting for Q,
(10a)

S

=

a[L 3 (D + 2L). 5 M"2 ]

-

b[L "3 (D + 2L) "5 M 2 ] 2

-

cM

This function, illustrated in Figure A-1, will no longer increase in
surplus value indefinitely with output but rather will reach a peak
and then fall after some level of floorspace production has been
reached. Thus, developers would now be effectively constrained by
resource limitations on transferable development rights and land only
over a finite range of production. At output levels where marginal
surplus is negative, resource constraints would not be binding. If the
supply of TDRs were sufficient to exceed this level, their value
would evaporate and thereby introduce an additional consideration
for TDR planning at the regional level.
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LAND
FIGURE A-i
ISO-SURPLUS CURVES AS A FUNCTION OF LAND AND DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS GIVEN A DOWNWARD SLOPING DEMAND CURVE
FOR FLOORSPACE

D. The Consistency Between Zoning Constraints on Density
and the Number of Development Rights Created
An important planning consideration involves zoning constraints
on population density. As noted in the text, developers purchasing
TDRs might use them to exceed existing zoning limitations on density in growth areas. Thus, for example, a developer obtaining TDRs
from owners of non-developable land would be permitted to build
two housing units on an acre of land in a growth area originally
zoned for residential development on one acre lots. As a practical
consideration, however, there would probably be limitations on how
much the original zoning regulations might be exceeded. In the same
example, the developer might not be allowed to build higher density
garden apartments even with the addition of a sufficient number of
TDRs. Thus, upper limits on density act as controls for planning
authorities over the configuration of development.
Density restrictions also affect the market exchange value of TDRs
and therefore, should be part of a community's TDR plan. In particular, they will depress the total rent accruing to development
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2
T

L*
FIGURE A-2

LAND

ISO-SURPLUS CURVES AND A ZONING DENSITY CONSTRAINT

rights holders if they are set so low that not all transferable development rights can be legally used. To see how an inconsistency between the number of transferable development rights created and the
density limitations in a community can arise and to see the effects of
this inconsistenty we turn to Figure A-2. The diagram shows isosurplus curves for floor space construction, a land constraint (L*) for
the community, and a density constraint (a). Density is interpreted
as the ratio of housing units embodied in transferable development
rights per unit of land and this appears as a ray emanating from the
origin. Combinations of land and TDRs below the ray satisfy the
zoning constraint while those above the ray exceed the permitted
number of housing units added per acre with TDRs. In the figure a
supply of transferable development rights limited to the quantity T'
constrains developers to an area below the density limits and the
TDRs will command a positive market exchange value. If the number
of TDRs issued, however, is T' developers will not be able to employ
the full supply without exceeding the density constraint. If these
density ordinances are enforced, therefore, the TDRs will not be in
scarce supply and will have little value. The effect of the density
constraint is to produce a truncated bid rent curve for TDRs as
illustrated in Figure A-3.
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TDRs
FIGURE A-3
TRUNCATED BID RENT CURVE FOR TDRs (B) AND SUPPLY OF
TDRS NOT EXCEEDING DENSITY CONSTRAINT (T 1) AND
EXCEEDING DENSITY CONSTRAINT (T2 )

